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Book Review: Accounting for Ministers: Scandal and Survival
in British Government 1945-2007
Accounting for Ministers uses the tools of modern political science to analyse the factors which determine
the fortunes of Cabinet ministers. Utilising agency theory, it describes Cabinet government as a system of
incentives for prime ministerial and parliamentary rule. Lord Wilson has reservations about the attempts to
analyse the rich, complex, impossible lives of Ministers with the methods of political analysis used in this book
but nevertheless finds it a useful addition to the sum of political knowledge. 
Accounting for Ministers: Scandal and Survival in Brit ish
Government 1945-2007. Samuel Berlinksi, Torun Dewan and Keith
Dowding. Cambridge University Press. 2012.
Find this book 
Do not read this book if  you are looking f or t it ilating holiday reading
about the private lives of  Ministers. That is not what it is about. It is an
ambitious academic attempt by two polit ical scientists and an economist
to answer questions about Ministerial tenure in the UK by analysing a
large data-base of  inf ormation about polit icians over the period. To what
extent does a Minister ’s length of  t ime in of f ice depend on
characteristics that are f ixed when they are appointed? What ef f ect do
polit ical events, in particular calls f or the resignation of  a Minister, have
upon their tenure? What do the data on Ministerial careers say about the
nature of  accountability in Brit ish polit ics, and the relationship between
Ministers and their Prime Ministers?
I read it through the prism of  my own experience as a civil servant who
worked with Ministers (including two Prime Ministers) f or over half  the period. I f ound myself
wanting to leap in regularly and say: “Hold on a second, what about…” or “Isn’t there a key
point…” or occasionally just “No!”. I have reservations about attempting to analyse the rich, complex,
impossible lives of  Ministers with such equations as:
“Tigf = α+Xigβ’ + Zigγ+ Bgδ’ + Pgfλ’ + εigf  where Tigf is the spell of  minister i, in government g, at the time of
f ailure f etc
And yet I f ound the book intriguing as well as f rustrating.
The analysis of  Ministers’ characteristics is interesting though not perhaps as earth-shaking as the
authors imply. They must have put huge ef f ort into it. One learns f or instance that Cabinet Ministers are
older, on average by some nine years, than junior Ministers (p. 65). But it is not unusual in any prof ession
f or people at the top to be older than those still climbing the ladder. We are told that, in terms of  survival,
nothing much distinguishes the cohort of  Ministers who have been to public school f rom those who have
not (p. 72). Af ter the f irst 18 months or so in of f ice, those with Oxbridge backgrounds appear to be more
durable but the authors cannot distinguish whether this is due to their education, their underlying ability or
other f actors such as socialisation (p.72). So f ar, so mildly interesting.
The authors are surprised to f ind that Ministers who have previous experience of  serving in of f ice are
some 40 per cent more likely to lose of f ice than those who enter government without such experience
(p.74). But is this really surprising? Most Ministers in these highly pressured jobs begin to t ire af ter, say, 7
or 8 years. It does not seem all that unusual f or people in their later years to be more likely to leave than
those still in hot pursuit of  their ambition. The one f inding which really does stand out is that, af ter roughly
two months in of f ice, f emale ministers have a higher chance of  survival than their male counterparts.
Whereas 75 per cent of  women in government survive a f ull f ive-year term, just over 60 per cent of  their
male colleagues do so (p.74). The authors do not explore the reasons f or this but it is an intriguing insight.
The analysis of  resignations similarly contains nuggets. The authors have identif ied 91 ‘f orced exits’ over
the period (p. 121): that is to say, Ministerial resignations which took place quite separately f rom reshuf f les
and Elections and without the planning of  the Prime Minister, because the Minister decided to quit or was
f orced to do so by controversy or scandal (p.117). One winces as the proximate reasons f or these f orced
exits are squeezed into eight categories: personal error, departmental error, sexual scandal, f inancial
scandal, policy disagreement, personality clash, perf ormance and ‘other controversy’. But in real lif e
Ministers of ten leave government f or a mix of  reasons. Where, f or instance, would you put Prof umo? The
authors coded him as personal error because he had admitted to the Chief  Whip that he had misled
Parliament (p. 131). So I am wary of  the resulting analysis. Even so, it is interesting that it suggests that by
f ar the largest reason f or f orced exits was policy disagreement; that f orced exits f or policy disagreements
were much more likely in Labour governments; and that the largest number of  f orced exits, f or whatever
reason, took place under Mr Blair (22) compared with Mr Major (16) and Mrs Thatcher (13) (p. 128-9).
There is similar intriguing analysis of  the ef f ect of  resignation calls on Ministerial tenure. The likelihood of
a Minister losing of f ice prematurely roughly doubles if  he or she f aces one resignation call and roughly
quadruples with a second resignation call (p. 165); and the likelihood of  a Minister being f orced out of
of f ice by a resignation call is higher if  other Ministers of  the same government have already f aced similar
calls (p. 168). Working inside government one knows all too well the f eeling when the polit ical world and the
media have begun to smell blood around a Minister or government. It is f ascinating to see this conf irmed by
this analysis.
So why my f rustration? For all sorts of  reasons. For instance, I am irked by the theory that the relationship
between Prime Ministers and their Ministers is one between principal and agent (since when did agents sack
their principal as Ministers did with Mrs Thatcher? and what about the important role of  backbenchers?). I
f ound twenty pages on the style of  successive Prime Ministers f lat- f ooted and not really integrated with
the rest of  the analysis. There were hypotheses and occasionally plain errors which betrayed an ignorance
of  how governments work. I longed f or this analysis to be enriched by a historian or student of  government
who could throw light on the real lif e behind these conclusions. But I do not want to be churlish. I applaud
the ef f ort and technical ability of  the authors and, f or all my reservations, think their book is a usef ul
addition to the sum of  polit ical knowledge.
———————————————————————————
Lord Wilson of Dinton GCB (Richard Wilson) served in the Civil Service f or 36 years in a number of
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